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Abstract: Across Latin America, conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), in which 
governments pay poor families conditional on their children attending school, have 
successfully increased enrollment and attendance rates. No empirical evidence supports 
the need for costly conditionality, however, and I compare the effect of unconditional 
remittances to the effect of CCTs to determine which more strongly influences 
educational investment. I test the outcomes of school enrollment and attendance and find 
that unconditional transfers more strongly impact enrollment, while conditional transfers 
more strongly increase attendance. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) are government safety net programs in 
which poor families receive monthly cash transfers conditional on child school 
attendance.1 By tying the cash to education and health outcomes, the government 
theoretically achieves dual goals of relieving short-term poverty and investing in long-
term human capital. Handa and Davis’s (2006) assertion that CCTs “have come to 
dominate the social protection sector in Latin America” is beyond debate. Mexico was 
the first of at least eight countries to use a CCT to pay poor, rural families a stipend so 
long as they ensured that their kids enrolled in and attended school (Schultz 2006). 
Families were required to take young children for health checkups and vaccinations, as 
well as ensure enrollment in school and attendance of a minimum of 85% of available 
school days. The monthly transfers, often worth 50% or more of a family’s budget, 
reduced short-term poverty while serving as an investment in children’s human capital 
(Schultz 2006). By 2004, Latin American governments were allocating over $5 billion 
annually to these hybrid social safety net-human capital development programs (Caldés, 
Coady & Maluccio 2006).  
 Despite this popularity, a recent cohort of studies highlights various forms of CCT 
inefficiency as investments in human capital. Caldés, Coady and Maluccio (2006) show 
that program administrative and condition monitoring costs represented 40% of the 
Nicaraguan CCT’s budget, suggesting large cost-savings if conditions are not necessary. 
In their study of CCTs, Sadoulet and de Janvry (2006) show that because different 
families have different thresholds below which they cannot afford school, differentiating 
                                                 
1 Most CCTs, including the one in Nicaragua, also transfer cash conditional on doctor visits for children.  
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transfer levels based on this threshold could save CCTs 11% of their budgets by ensuring 
that they are not paying families whose children would attend school regardless.  
Sadoulet and de Janvry’s proposed targeting adjustments would result in a 
resource allocation in which each family receives exactly what it needs to enroll or invest 
in attendance. They conclude that this type of efficiency is especially important in poor 
countries like Nicaragua that face governmental budget constraints and extensive 
poverty. Interestingly, Handa and Davis (2006) conclude that the need for conditions on 
Latin American transfers has not been established empirically.  
The objective of this paper is to perform an empirical test of Nicaragua’s CCT 
panel data to establish the effect of the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) on education 
relative to the effect of unconditional remittance income. I respond to Sadulet and de 
Janvry’s (2006) distinction between the two goals of CCTs: to internalize positive 
externalities associated with long-run continued attendance in school and reduction in 
short-term poverty such that families can enroll their children in school. Hence, I test the 
effects of unconditional and conditional transfers on both attendance and enrollment.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature about 
cash transfers, to situate this analysis in an empirical niche. Section III develops a 
theoretical model to guide empirical analysis. Section IV summarizes and discusses the 
Nicaraguan CCT data. Section V presents the empirical technique and discusses its 
associated estimation issues. Section VI compares panel probit and tobit estimates of the 
relative effects of conditional and unconditional transfers on education outcomes. Section 
VII concludes.  
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II. Previous Literature   
 
Gammeltoft (2002) provides evidence that remittances are the least costly and 
most prolific form of unconditional transfers in Latin America. Authors concur that both 
types of transfer improve educational outcomes, with conditional cash transfers having 
raised school enrollment and attendance rates unambiguously in CCT program countries 
(see Schultz (2004); Hoddinott & Skoufias (2004); Skoufias & Parker (2001); Maluccio 
& Flores (2006); Sridhar & Duffield (2006); Schady & Araujo (2008); Glewwe & 
Kassouf (2009)).  Remittances also improve education and they do so without the 
presence of a condition (see Edwards & Ureta, 2003; Calero et al (2004); Malone 
(2006)).   
This dichotomy between the effectiveness of conditions relative to unconditional 
transfers is the center of a debate about improving rural education outcomes. Studies 
suggest that poor families in the developing world choose less-than-optimal amounts of 
education for children, but they disagree about why. Inchauste (2000) shows that cash 
transfers do not significantly improve schooling in Bolivia for women or indigenous 
minorities, suggesting that constraints like geography, parental education and culture may 
dominate pure liquidity constraints.  
An opposing body of work shows that poor rural families respond to changes in 
income with respect to education. Levison and Moe (1998) and Levison, Moe and Knaul 
(2001) show this response with respect to non-market “shadow” wages of children, while 
Rosenweig (1990), Brown and Park (2001), Lloyd et al. (2006) and Glewwe and Jacoby 
(2004) show responsiveness to educational investment with respect to liquid income.  
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In its recent study on CCTs, the World Bank (2009) outlines a different 
theoretical debate about the necessity of conditions on cash transfers, centering on under-
investment in schooling. Educational investment may be below the private optimum if 
parents and children underestimate the future returns to schooling. There may also be a 
less-than-optimal social level of education if schooling can lead to positive social 
externalities like civic engagement or lower crime. Internalizing these positive 
externalities with subsidies and transfers may also be an important political tool to attract 
popular support for publicly-funded social safety nets. In contrast, however, public cash 
may have a steep opportunity cost if it is not invested in alternative public projects. The 
World Bank ultimately concludes that market-driven economic growth is likely the best 
poverty-reduction plan, but that public projects like CCTs may be a necessary 
supplement. It does not provide empirical support for this claim.  
Earlier studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence against CCTs and 
unconditional transfers as tools for economic development. Cox and Jimenez (1990) find 
that (unconditional) public transfers “crowd out” private cash. In the presence of such 
transfers, the marginal value of each remittance diminishes, reducing migrants’ incentives 
to remit at all. This “crowding out” effect may also eliminate improved credit markets 
that result from the presence of remitted cash (Taylor 1999). Additionally, Martinelli and 
Parker (2003) show theoretically that conditionally transferred cash can alter incentive 
structures and result in an overinvestment in human capital. Parents suffer in the short run 
as they allocate an inefficient level of resources to education, and children ultimately pay 
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the cost as they receive lower bequests later in life. In these cases, allocating investment 
money privately may result in a more efficient outcome.2  
Additional studies provide evidence against the effectiveness of remittances in 
improving educational outcomes. Chami et al. (2003) show with a panel from over 100 
countries through 29 years that remittances are often countercyclical and do not go 
toward economic development. Instead of sending money home that can be invested in 
education, remitters only relieve temporary budget constraints during economic 
downturns. In these cases, the targeted and intentional nature of CCTs may be needed to 
achieve long-run gains in human capital.  
The preceding discussion emphasizes the debate surrounding the value of 
conditions on cash transfers as an educational investment. The following section develops 
a theoretical model with which to apply this question to the Nicaraguan data.  
 
III. Theoretical Model 
 
Most CCT analysis papers include a set of general assumptions in place of a 
formal model. A simple family-utility maximization framework effectively frames the 
typical Nicaraguan family’s tradeoff between education and other consumption and 
provides the basis for empirical analysis. This model assumes that the child’s only 
opportunity cost of education is the value of her production in the home and that children 
do earn such a shadow wage when not in school.3 The typical CCT’s condition requires 
attendance of at least 85% of available days and I assume that families will not choose to 
allocate more than the necessary number of days, since they face an opportunity cost of 
                                                 
2 It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that cash bequests are minimal or non-existent in rural 
Nicaragua. Parents often bequest land to children but land likely doesn’t factor into schooling and 
consumption decisions.  
3 Levison and Moe (1998) demonstrate the empirical validity of this assumption.  
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consumption. Decisions in this model flow from the assumption that families accurately 
value the returns to a given level educational investment and that the future value of 
education is worth a family’s present level of investment. This assumption likely does not 
hold in reality and relaxing it will help explain this paper’s empirical results.  
 To see the relationship between the type of transfer – conditional or unconditional 
– and education outcomes, consider two possible family resource allocation scenarios in 
rural Nicaragua.  The first suggests that an unconditional cash transfer regime is efficient 
and the second suggests that a conditional regime is efficient. The first scenario, depicted 
in Figure 1, illustrates a family that, along the first, pre-transfer, budget constraint, 
initially allocates more heavily toward schooling than other consumption. This family 
represents a typical unconditional-regime family in that it does not require conditions on 
cash transfers to improve school attendance. The presence of an unconditional transfer 
(remittance) shifts the budget constraint outward to the post-transfer constraint.4 The 
difference in attendance levels between the unconditional allocation (utility curve 3) and 
the level required by the condition (utility curve 2) is small. In this case the condition 
itself does not induce a high increase in school and its cost may therefore be more 
efficiently spent elsewhere.  
Figure 2 illustrates the analogous case for a typical family that does not originally 
allocate much school due to the non-liquidity constraints discussed in section I and 
therefore requires conditions on transfers. These conditional transfers shift the budget 
constraint outward to the post-transfer constraint. The dotted portion of the new budget 
constraint is unattainable under the conditional regime that requires 85% attendance. The 
                                                 
4 This model assumes that remittances are equal in magnitude to the CCTs’ cash transfer; the RPS data 
justify this assumption, as described in section III.   
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difference in attendance between the unconditional and conditional equilibria in this 
situation is large, suggesting that the conditions may be valuable in increasing school 
attendance. There is also a significant potential drop in family utility (from utility curve 3 
to utility curve 2) if the family is required to allocate more education than they otherwise 
would. Taken together, these scenarios indicate that if the difference between the 
conditional and unconditional outcomes is small, then investing in the program may not 
be worthwhile, whereas if the difference is great, then investment in the program likely is 
valuable.  Analysis of a family’s enrollment decision would follow analogous reasoning.  
The preceding discussion applies only to families who face some type of 
constraint with respect to education. There are also families that do not face educational 
constraints. The matrix in Table 1 includes these types of families. The top of the matrix 
divides families among those that face constraints – the type in this analysis – and those 
that do not. The left side of the matrix divides families by those who inherently value 
education and those who do not. Hence, families in the upper left quadrant that face 
constraints but do value education are the “typical unconditional regime” families that 
only require an expansion of the budget constraint. Those in the lower left that face 
constraints but do not inherently value education are the “typical conditional regime” 
families discussed above. Families in the upper right who do not face constraints and 
value education require no intervention. Finally, families in the lower right quadrant that 
do not face constraints and also do not value education simply justify laws requiring 
school attendance.  
 The prolificacy and success of CCTs at improving education for those families 
that do face educational constraints in Latin America suggest a null hypothesis that 
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families may face only liquidity constraints for education; the expected hypothesis is that 
conditions will encourage families to respond to non-liquidity educational constraints that 
unconditional transfers would not. The following guiding equations incorporate both 
conditional transfers from the RPS program and unconditional remittances, as well as 
other education-determinative controls for empirical estimation:  
(1)     Attendanceit=f(RPS, remittancesit, Xit) 
(2)    Enrollmentit=f(RPS, remittancesit, Xit) 
The two regressions test conditional and unconditional cash transfers on the two primary 
education outcome indicators, attendance and enrollment. Comparison of the magnitude 
of conditional and unconditional transfers will suggest which more strongly impacts 
attendance and enrollment. Enrollment is a binary variable and both enrollment and 
attendance are indexed over time t and across students i, while X is a vector of 
household- and person-specific control variables. Variables such as age, whether the 
child works, grade and distance to school should have negative coefficients, since 
increases in each should decrease the probability of enrollment and attendance in school. 
The presence of the program or of remittances, as well as income, should increase school 
attendance and enrollment. Theory does not unambiguously predict signs for child 
gender, occupation and industry of the family. 5 The binary indicator farmer accounts for 
differences arising for families for which agriculture is the primary income source.  
 
IV.  Data and Summary Statistics 
 
                                                 
5 Maluccio and Flores (2004) write the seminal analysis of RPS and do not indicate, specifically, which 
controls they use. In his analysis of Progresa in Mexico, Schultz (2004) includes child age, gender, level of 
parent education and distance to school. I include these, as well as other theoretically intuitive controls.  
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Nicaragua’s RPS was allocated with randomized control and treatment groups 
within the entire rural poor population to isolate the effects of intervention from any 
“natural” improvement. The remittance recipients were not randomly assigned, 
presenting a potential endogeneity bias since decisions about education and remittances 
are likely made simultaneously.  The dataset contains the necessary variables to measure 
school achievement and remittances, as well as most theory-specified control variables. 
RPS is the result of collaboration between the Nicaraguan government and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), with World Bank funding. The first 
sample was collected in 2000 before initiation of the program and post-treatment data 
were collected in 2001 and 2002. The initial program covered 9750 people (1764 
families) of whom 4920 were in the treatment group in 2000.6 The school transfer had an 
annual value of US $112 and targeted children ages 7-13 who had not yet completed 4th 
grade of primary school.7 All families in the treatment group also received a conditional 
food subsidy transfer with an annual value of $224, regardless of their receipt of the 
education transfer. There is therefore no way in these data to distinguish the education 
transfer from the food transfer, making the effective conditional transfer $336 annually.8 
For the typical rural Nicaraguan family, this represents nearly 20% of total expenditures. 
The school-age population is nearly perfectly divided between the treatment and control 
groups. All data are publically available on IFPRI’s website.9 
                                                 
6 Program attrition saw this number fall to 4774 by 2002. 
7 I convert from Córdobas to dollars with September 2000 average Córdoba/dollar exchange rate of 12.80. 
8 Maluccio and Flores (2006) identify this problem and make the same assumption about the value of the 
conditional transfer. 
9 The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) makes available the Nicaragua data and other 
publications related RPS on its website. http://www.ifpri.org/  
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Tables 2 through 4 present summary statistics for all estimated variables in all 
years. Currency data are reported in year 2000 U.S. dollars relying on the 2000 
Córdoba/dollar exchange rate of 12.83. In 2000, 59.7% of eligible students were enrolled 
in school; by 2002 71.3% were enrolled. Attendance is measured as the number of school 
days missed in the month prior to the survey, and for each year includes around 2000 
individual children. This variable has strong right skew (see Figure 3); in 2000 63% had 
perfect attendance and by 2002 81.2% missed no school. I therefore take the natural log 
of the variable and rely on a tobit estimation technique to address this clustering (Figure 
4). On average, in the baseline, the number of days missed is 2.92, and decreases as 
expected to 1.31 and 1.15 in 2001 and 2002, respectively.  For each year there are a 
possible 22 days per month of school attendance.  
The dataset records which families have members who have migrated, which 
migrants send remittances, and how much they remit. This variable is heavily right 
skewed, which potentially affects its comparison to the value of RPS’s conditional 
transfers.  The average annual remittance of the 807 people who lived in a remittance-
receiving family is $309.27, close to the total value of the conditional transfer.10 
Reflecting its skewness, the median annual remittance is $140.62 and the average annual 
remittance after omitting 65 statistical outliers is $196.87.11 On average, however, the 
magnitude of remittances is comparable to the conditional transfer. 
Around 7000 people recorded that they worked in the week prior to each survey. 
The binary indicator work used in all regressions incorporates both paid hours and work 
defined as household production. Distance from school also explains attendance rates; 
                                                 
10 The average yearly remittance is $8.70 for the entire program population including those who received 
no remittances.  
11 I consider any observation greater than 1.5(75th percentile-25th percentile) + 75th percentile an outlier.  
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this variable contains 2000 observations. The average student lives approximately one 
kilometer from school. The average age of the RPS population increases from 21.14 
years to only 22.14 over the panel’s three years, reflecting the fact that people are born 
into and move and die out of the sample population. There are 50 percent women in the 
sample.  
The dataset does not measure family income, an important determinant of 
resource allocation. Hence, I use total yearly expenditures as a proxy for family income, 
under the assumption that private savings is minimal. In 2000, average yearly 
expenditures were $1735.70 and did not change substantially over the life of the program. 
The “farmer” dummy variable indicates that nearly 89% of all families worked primarily 
in agriculture. Finally, I control for parent education level by including the maximum 
level of education achieved by either parent in the family. This variable ranges from a 
minimum of one year to a maximum of six, with a mean of just over four years.  
Data Structure 
 
 Due to incompleteness of the dataset, several RPS variables required assumptions 
and restructuring in order to assemble variables for estimation. The remittance variable 
records the total amount of remittances received by each family from all relatives living 
abroad. For each migrant who sent money, the original dataset records the remitted 
amount and the period over which that amount was sent: semi-monthly, monthly, 
trimester, semi-annually or annually. Since RPS was allocated on a monthly basis, I 
normalized all remittance values to monthly transfers in order to match frequency 
between independent variables of interest. I then summed all family remittances for each 
household, to generate the final household monthly remittance variable. This sum also 
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includes the monetary amount of all in-kind transfers. Therefore, each member of a given 
family is recorded as receiving the same amount of remittances. I assume that families 
with no recorded remittance income received no remittances and therefore replace 
missing remittance values with zero.  
 The household parent education variable reflects the highest level of education 
attained by either of the parents. The binary dependent variable enrollment is a 
combination of all attendance data. That is, it is one for everyone who is recorded to 
attend or has attendance records and zero for all school-age children who are recorded 
under either the enrollment or attendance variables as not currently attending. Because 
the dataset only records attendance data for the month prior to the survey it is a 
potentially inaccurate representation of yearly attendance. Enrollment has more 
observations than either attends or attendance because it aggregates both variables.  
  
V. Empirical Approach  
 
The theoretical model presented above suggests that it is the nature of a family’s 
educational constraint that determines whether conditional or unconditional transfers 
should have a greater affect on enrollment and attendance in school. The following 
guiding equation will yield coefficients on remittances and RPS for comparison:  
 
(3) Educational_Outcomeit = α0 + β0remittancesit + β1RPSit + β2lnexpenditureit + β3ageit + 
β4genderit + β5distanceit + β6workit + β7parent_educationit + εit 
 
 
In this equation i indexes individual children, t denotes years of the sample and εi is a 
stochastic error term. Expenditure records the total annual value of a family’s 
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expenditures as a proxy for (non-existent) income data. To estimate enrollment, equation 
(3) will use a maximum likelihood panel probit estimator, presented with marginal effects 
coefficients. To estimate attendance, equation (3) will use a panel tobit regression to 
account for the fact that approximately 80% of all observations show perfect attendance 
throughout the panel. As robustness checks I estimate the effect of remittances isolated to 
the RPS control group and of CCTs with families who received no remittances, in order 
to establish both transfer types’ “pure” effects. 
Estimation Issues 
 
 In the RPS communities, decisions to fund migration and invest remittance 
income in education are likely made simultaneously, or are both jointly determined by 
unobserved variation. If a household decides to allocate resources to fund migration in 
order to receive remittances, it may be with the intention of improving education 
outcomes. This endogeneity will bias the coefficient estimates and likely over-predict the 
effect of remittances on education.  
 To address this bias I estimate an instrumental proxy for remittances using the 
concentration of families with a migrant in each community. This is the instrumental 
variable approach in Acosta (2006). This migrant “network” effect should help new 
people migrate and thus be highly correlated with remittance income.  As a relative 
concentration, however, it should not be inherently correlated with individual family 
education decisions, thus mitigating the simultaneity. These instrumented observations 
are potentially biased in themselves in that they contain the same households in the 
regression, and that the neighborhood network effect may induce more migration for 
education investment. Hausman endogeneity tests and Wald Chi-squared exogeneity tests 
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with simple OLS estimators both suggest that remittances are endogenous with education 
outcomes. Hence, I include the instrumented remittance observations in place of 
remittances for both dependent variables. Equation five predicts the instrument:  
 
(5) lnRemittancesi =  α0 + β1lnexpendituresit + β2ageit + β3genderit  + β4workit + 
β5parent_educationit + β6Farmerit + β7PercentCommuityMigrantit + εit 
 
where Percent Community Migrant is the excluded instrument used in all instrumental 
regressions. Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the first 
stage instrumental regression. In this regression, expenditures, the excluded instrument 
and the level of parent education are all statistically significant in predicting the natural 
log of remittances.  
 The sample of children who attend school is likely biased because it 
systematically excludes students who do not enroll. The Heckman model adjusts for this 
type of sample bias and ideally would be used in this analysis. Due to the way the 
enrollment data are collected, however, there is no accurate method to censor the 
attendance observations for a Heckman regression. Conclusions from attendance 
regressions must therefore be interpreted in light of this potential bias.  
 There is no significant heteroskedasticity or colinearity between independent 
variables (see Table 5 for pairwise correlation coefficients and Table 6 for Variance 
Inflation Factor results). The regressions include household fixed effects and have a 
relatively small horizon (three periods), indicating low risk of serial correlation or non-
stationarity of the error terms.  
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VI. Results 
 
Transfer Effects on Enrollment 
 
 Sadulet and de Janvry (2006) believe that CCTs will have a stronger effect on 
enrollment than attendance; families who have already decided to invest in school are 
likely to continue doing so. Thus, the more important outcome is encouraging families to 
invest for the first time. Hence, my primary estimation predicts enrollment as a function 
of RPS and remittances.  
Table 8 presents marginal effects coefficients of panel probit estimations for four 
equations. Equation I predicts enrollment with RPS and the natural log of remittances to 
show the effect of each in the presence of the other. Equation II incorporates the 
instrumented variable in place of remittances; equations III and IV estimate enrollment 
with RPS and instrumented remittances separately.  
Interpretation of the natural log of remittances coefficients is as follows. A one 
natural log-unit increase in remittances gives the corresponding coefficient’s percentage 
increase in the likelihood of enrollment. Evaluated at the mean level of remittances, an 
increase of one natural-log unit represents approximately $300, which happens to equal 
the value of RPS’s transfer. This coincidence allows roughly direct comparison between 
RPS and remittance coefficients.  
Equation I predicts that remittances increase the likelihood of enrollment by 3.6% 
when controlling for RPS, while conditional transfers increase the likelihood of 
enrollment by 2.5%, controlling for remittances. Both variables’ coefficients are 
significant at the one percent level. Eliminating the potential endogeneity in equation II 
increases the marginal effect of RPS to 2.6% and increases the effect of remittances 
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15.1%, both significant at one percent. Equations III and IV show that neither coefficient 
changes significantly when not controlling for the other. These comparative results 
indicate that unconditional transfers have a stronger effect on enrollment than conditional 
transfers. In all regressions, if the child works his or her probability of enrolling is 54% 
lower, significant at one percent. This strong effect is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that the opportunity cost of school is child work and that the two are 
substitutes. In all regressions, all other coefficients are significant with the expected 
signs, except for farmer. In rural Nicaragua 89% of all families are farmers, so its lack of 
variation could explain its statistical insignificance.  
Figure 5 plots cumulative density functions of the regression coefficients both 
with RPS and without RPS against remittances. The distance between the two functions 
shows the effect of RPS and their slope represents the effect of remittances. The two 
functions are close together and strongly upward sloping, verifying the result that 
unconditional transfers have a stronger effect than conditional transfers.  
In the RPS population, 67.2% of all eligible students were enrolled in school. It is 
tempting therefore to use this fact to create a “naïve” rule by which to test the predictions 
of the probit model. Guessing randomly with no other information that every student is 
enrolled in school would be successful 67.2% of the time, whereas the econometric 
model predicts enrollment status correctly 78.7% of the time. The “fit” of the model is 
78.7%, and it predicts enrollment 11.5% more accurately than a naïve guess.  
 
Transfer Effects on Attendance 
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 The long-run goal of RPS is to invest in human capital; that is, to ensure that once 
enrolled, students will stay in school. Table 9 presents a series of panel tobit regression 
estimates of RPS on attendance. Equation V does not include a remittance coefficient in 
order to establish the baseline effect of RPS on attendance. RPS is significant at the 1% 
level and predicts that children in the program miss 2.5 fewer days of school than control-
group children. The variables that record whether children work, are primarily in 
agriculture and the level of parent education are all significant with expected signs. In 
this model, age, gender and distance to school do not have a statistically significant effect 
on attendance, though they do have signs in the expected directions with reasonable 
coefficients. Increases in income predict lower school attendance, but this coefficient also 
is not statistically different from zero.  
 Incorporating the natural log of remittances in equation VI as an explanatory 
variable has no effect on the coefficients from equation V, and remittances are not 
statistically significant. Equation VII incorporates the instrumented proxy of remittances. 
This coefficient predicts that remittances raise attendance rates, but is not statistically 
different than zero. Its presence does not meaningfully affect any other coefficients. 
Equation VII estimates the effect of remittances not controlling for RPS, but this does not 
qualitatively change remittances’ magnitude or level of significance.   
 Table 10 presents point estimates, standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of 
the differences between the RPS and remittance coefficients for each type of regression. 
There is a statistically significant difference between the IV probit RPS and remittance 
coefficient and the RPS and non-instrumented remittance coefficients in the tobit model. 
The other regressions do not estimate statistically different coefficients.  
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Robustness  
 
 To examine the results’ sensitivity to specification, I change the sample size to 
include only observations effected by one type of transfer in order to identify the “pure” 
effects of each. Table 11 presents these pure effects with subsets of the data that 1) 
exclude RPS treatment observations, to isolate the effect of remittances; 2) exclude 
observations that received remittances, to isolate RPS effects; and 3) include only 
observations that received both conditional cash transfers and unconditional remittances. 
The primary specification forms from the earlier regressions are used for each data 
subset, including the instrumented remittance variable where possible and using panel 
probit and tobit regressions as appropriate. The first pane of Table 9 presents effects on 
enrollment and the second pane presents effects on attendance.  
 Isolated to the RPS control group, remittances improve the probability of 
enrollment by 21.9%, significantly greater than other specifications. Other variables 
remain significant at the 1% level and largely unchanged in magnitude. The coefficient 
on work is again high, predicting that working children have a 55% lower chance of 
enrolling in school. As in other specifications, remittances’ effect on attendance is 
negligible and not statistically differentiable from zero. Eliminating observations that 
receive remittances raises RPS’s effect on the probability of enrollment only slightly, 
from 2.5% to 2.8%, significant at the 1% level. In the very small sample of 169 
observations that received both conditional and unconditional transfers, no variables are 
statistically different from zero. This likely reflects the small sample size of this subset. 
 Similarly, there are not enough observations to estimate a regression on 
attendance using the observations that receive both types of transfers. In the sample 
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excluding RPS treatment observations, remittances are again not statistically significant 
in explaining attendance variation. Other coefficients also remain unchanged from the 
original specification. Excluding observations that receive remittances raises the effect of 
conditional transfers on attendance to 2.63%.  These alternative specifications confirm 
that the estimated coefficients are robust to changes in sample size and characteristics, as 
well as functional forms.  
VII. Conclusion 
 
 As expected, the RPS transfers have a positive, significant effect on enrollment 
and attendance in school in rural Nicaragua.  The data suggest, however, that 
unconditional remittances actually encourage higher rates of enrollment than conditional 
transfers. While there is no doubt that investing public money in human capital while 
relieving temporary budget constraints is valuable, this paper supports Sadulet and de 
Janvry’s (2006) conclusions that efficiency gains could be realized with unconditional 
transfers. 
 For example, money saved from monitoring conditions on families with only 
young, already-enrolled children could be focused more heavily on families with older 
children who face a steeper opportunity cost to education. Alternatively, governments 
could invest in means to facilitate migration and remittances, which also invest in human 
capital and in some cases enhance rural credit markets.  
 These results should be interpreted with some care. The remittance data are 
endogenous and, as discussed, the included instrumental variable is not free from 
problems. For example, while the average remittance is similar in magnitude to the CCT, 
its median value is much smaller. This discrepancy could help to explain the difference in 
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remittances’ effect on enrollment but not attendance. It is also possible that because the 
magnitude of remittances varies, it was their market-driven efficiency that resulted in a 
higher impact. Or perhaps the primary education constraint is monetary but families 
discount returns to continued education, making it easier to impact enrollment. Nicaragua 
is also the second poorest country in Latin America, so results from its CCT should be 
extrapolated with care. Rural poor populations in other countries may face entirely 
different constraints to education. Though problematic, Mexico’s CCT provides a 
potentially rich source to test these same hypotheses in a more developed nation with a 
more robust CCT. Finally, it should be noted that CCTs and remittances represent purely 
demand-side interventions in the rural education market. Due to poor and inconsistent 
schools, it is possible that families appropriately discount returns to education and 
improving education outcomes without improving school quality is less marginally 
productive than other investments. Supply-side improvements may raise the value of 
education sufficiently that demand-side interventions of much smaller magnitude are 
needed.  
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Tables 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 2000 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RPS 9747 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Enrollment 3444 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Attendance 2175 2.92 5.55 0 22 
Remittance 9747 8.44 93.39 0 4000 
Expense 9747 1731.64 1032.48 133.74 6745.34 
Age 9736 21.14 18.13 0 108 
Gender 9747 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Distance 1777 1.02 3.41 0 72 
Work 7635 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Farmer 8731 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Parent Ed. 7602 4.00 1.56 1 6 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 2001 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RPS 9463 0.52 0.49 0 1 
Enrollment 3282 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Attendance 2425 1.31 3.88 0 22 
Remittance 9463 9.81 139.67 0 4200 
Expense 9463 1623.53 940.27 156.34 7448.45 
Age 9405 21.57 18.17 0 110 
Gender 9463 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Distance 2071 0.96 2.18 0 49 
Work 7221 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Farmer 7951 0.89 0.32 0 1 
Parent Ed. 7824 4.03 1.56 1 6 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 2002 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RPS 9482 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Enrollment 3195 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Attendance 2380 1.15 3.87 0 22 
Remittance 9482 9.62 79.19 0 1200 
Expense 9482 1562.88 900.28 147.31 7142.98 
Age 9429 22.14 18.09 0 111 
Gender 9482 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Distance 2017 0.90 2.43 0 56 
Work 7003 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Farmer 8141 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Parent Ed. 8283 4.02 1.57 1 6 
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Table 6: Variance Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
work 1.15 0.87 
age 1.1 0.91 
lnexpense 1.07 0.93 
gender 1.06 0.95 
edparent 1.05 0.95 
RPS 1.04 0.96 
farmer 1.01 0.99 
lnremittance 1.01 0.99 
distancekm 1.00 1.00 
Mean VIF 1.05   
 
 
Table 7: Instrumented Remittances 
Expenditures 0.036 
 (0.011)*** 
Age 0.001 
 (0.00) 
Male -0.006 
 (0.02) 
Work -0.004 
 (0.02) 
Farmer -0.026 
 (0.02) 
Parent Education 0.027 
 (0.004)*** 
Percent Community Migrant  4.979 
 (0.151)*** 
Constant -0.477 
  (0.113)*** 
Observations 15889 
R-squared 0.07 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Covariate Effect on Enrollment 
 Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit 
RPS  0.025 0.026 - 0.025 
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** - (0.015)*** 
Log Remittances 0.036 0.151 0.15 - 
 (0.009)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)*** - 
Expenditures 0.09 0.083 0.086 0.091 
 (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Male 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.09 
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** 
Work -0.536 -0.533 -0.536 -0.532 
 (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** 
Farmer 0 0.008 0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.020) (-0.021) -0.02 -0.021 
Parent Education 0.014 0.01 0.01 0.015 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)*** 
Constant -3.028 -2.708 -2.785 -3.051 
 (0.530)*** (0.530)*** (0.529)*** (-0.528)*** 
Observations 6457 6457 6457 6457 
Log-likelihood -2950.721 -2946.719 -2948.294 -2959.498 
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects estimates across students and 
through time. Standard Errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. ** 
Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. The non-instrumented regressions 
have psuedo R2s of 0.116 and 0.114, respectively. RPS is 1 for treatment; 0 
for control. Remittances are in log form. Distance does not vary 
sufficiently across the dependent variable for regression. Total yearly 
expenditures proxy family income. Work records whether the student 
worked in the previous week. Farmer indicates if the student's family is 
primarily in agriculture.  
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Table 9: Covariate Effect on Attendance 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit IV  Tobit IV 
RPS -2.500 -2.504 -2.510 - 
 (0.469)*** (0.468)*** (0.468)*** - 
Log Remittances - 0.247 -1.447 -1.319 
 - (0.260) (1.063) (1.058) 
Expenditures 0.072 0.067 0.114 -0.244 
 (0.439) (0.439) (0.440) -(0.439) 
Age 0.082 0.083 0.074 0.075 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.08) 
Male 0.446 0.454 0.418 0.304 
 (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.477) 
Distance to School 0.153 0.152 0.159 0.155 
 (0.077)* (0.077)* (0.077)** (0.078)* 
Work 5.096 5.089 5.165 5.326 
 (0.816)*** (0.815)*** (0.817)*** (0.821)*** 
Farmer -2.991 -2.992 -2.994 -2.872 
 (0.707)*** (0.707)*** (0.707)*** (0.710)*** 
Parent Education -0.314 -0.324 -0.259 -0.23 
 (0.151)** (0.152)** (0.156)* 0.16  
Constant -5.243 -5.19 -5.567 -3.532 
 (4.387) (4.386) (4.388) (4.411) 
Observations 4511 4511 4511 4511 
Notes: All regressions are indexed across observations and through time. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** 
Significant at 1%. RPS is 1 for treatment; 0 for control. Total yearly expenses 
proxy family income. Work records whether the student worked in the 
previous week. Farmer indicates if the student's family is primarily in 
agriculture.  
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Table 10: Lincom Tests Between Remittances and RPS 
  Coefficient Standard Error 95% Conf. Int 
Probit 0.05 (0.078) (-0.104)- (0.203) 
IV Probit 0.656 (0.151)** (.269) - (.862) 
Tobit 2.750 (0.538)** (1.69) - (3.806) 
IV Tobit 1.063 (1.151) (-1.193) - (3.320) 
Notes: The above statistics are point estimates, standard errors 
and confidence intervals of the difference between remittance and 
RPS coefficients for each type of regression. Starred standard 
errors represent coefficients that are statistically different from 
each other at the 5% confidence level.  
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Table 11: "Pure" Effects Regressions 
  Enrollment Attendance 
 
Unconditional 
Transfers 
Only 
Conditional 
Transfers 
Only 
Conditional 
and 
Unconditional 
Only 
Unconditional 
Transfers 
Only 
Conditional 
Transfers 
Only 
Conditional 
and 
Unconditional 
Transfers 
RPS - 0.028 0.000 - -2.627 - 
 - (0.015)* (0.00) - (0.469)*** - 
Remittances 0.219 - 0.000 -0.069 - - 
 (0.054)*** - (0.00) (0.1.649) - - 
Expenditures 0.063 0.094 0.000 1.183 0.156 - 
 (0.018)*** (0.012)*** (0.00) (0.576)** (0.44) - 
Age -0.01 -0.005 0.000 0.183 0.039 - 
 (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.00) (0.11) (0.08) - 
Male 0.087 0.096 0.000 0.344 0.607 - 
 (0.026)*** (0.016)*** (0.00) (0.68) (0.47) - 
Distance  - - - 0.049 0.165 - 
 - - - (0.107)** (0.076)** - 
Work -0.55 -0.548 -0.007 3.52 5.619 - 
 (0.043)*** (0.030)*** (0.02) (1.113)*** (0.818)*** - 
Farmer -0.012 0.004 0.000 -1.655 -3.21 - 
 -(0.03) -(0.02) (0.00) -(1.07) (0.710)*** - 
Parent Ed.  0.015 0.015 0.000 -0.484 -0.358 - 
 (0.034)* (0.005)*** (0.00) (-0.226)** (0.151)* - 
Constant -1.321 -3.134 -4.017 -17.42 -5.188 - 
 (0.749)* (0.534)*** (7.27) (5.711)*** -4.439 - 
Observations 3211 6288 169 2116 4377 - 
Notes: All regressions are across observations and through time. Probit regressions present marginal effects.  
Standard Errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. RPS is 1 for 
treatment; 0 for control. Total yearly expenses proxy family income. Work records whether the student worked 
in the previous week. Farmer indicates if the student's family is primarily in agriculture. There were insufficient 
observations to estimate the effects of both types of transfers only on attendance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
